Sandra Polanía-Reyes

Job Market Candidate

University College London and University of Siena

My job market paper examines the role of a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program in overcoming coordination failures. I design and conduct a laboratory economic experiment in the field based on a ‘Weak-link’ Coordination game. By estimating a structural choice model of the individual decision to coordinate, I identify beliefs about others’ behavior as the main determinant of equilibrium effort: high effort is only sustained under high beliefs. I also estimate the effect of exposure to the CCT program on the coordination effort: longer exposure to the program increases the likelihood to exert the highest level of effort.

Job Market Paper Teaching Research CV Email

Teaching and Research Fields

  • Primary
  • Experimental Economics
  • Development Economics
  • Secondary
  • Behavioral Economics
  • Microeconomics
  • Applied microeconometrics

Contact

  • Phone: +1 (734) 277 - 1984
  • spolaniareyes at gmail.com
  • Skypename: spolani
  • Currently visiting UC Berkeley, CA, USA
  • Department of Economics
  • University College London
  • 30 Gordon Street, WC1H 0AX London, UK
Photo credit: Les Solorzano